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THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED WHEN IT REFUSED TO APPOINT 
SUBSTITUTE COUNSEL, OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, THE COURT ERRED 
WHEN IT FAILED TO HOLD A PROPER HEARING IN RESPONSE TO MR. 
POKORNEY'S REQUEST FOR SUBSTITUTE COUNSEL 
First of all, the state is just wrong in its assertion that Appellant does not 
challenge the district court's findings that there was no ineffective assistance of 
counsel or an actual conflict of interest. In his opening brief Appellant argues 
that the district court's rulings denying substitute counsel were erroneous 
because there was good cause. The lying, threatening and colluding and 
actions/inactions of counsel described in Mr. Pokorney's letters are more than 
sufficient to establish either ineffective assistance of counsel or an actual conflict 
of interest. Therefore, as already argued, the failure to find good cause on those 
facts (taking them as true) is error. 
But in addition, Appellant in his opening brief also separately and 
independently challenges the ruling where the court finds there is no conflict of 
interest and therefore denies the request for substitute counsel. Appellant 
specifically argues that the court's ruling denying substitute counsel is erroneous 
and must be reversed because the court applied the wrong legal standard. 
The state is likewise wrong when it claims that the court's ruling, to wit, 
even taking every bit of the letters as true they do not constitute good cause to 
remove counsel, was an alternate grounds for denying the motion for substitute 
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counsel. The state claims that instead, the primary grounds of denying the 
motion were the court's earlier rulings that the attorney was not ineffective and 
also, does not have a conflict with Mr. Pokorney. But those were also the exact 
grounds that the court was addressing with its later ruling, it was just expounding 
on its factual findings (really, the lack thereof). 
To further explain, earlier, the court had ruled that Mr. Pokorney was not 
entitled to substitute counsel, but this was based on only general findings. The 
court did not make findings on the many, many, many, facts asserted by Mr. 
Pokorney in the 16 pages of his two letters. When the court was taken to task 
about its failure to hear Mr. Pokorney's arguments regarding those facts (more 
on this below), the court stated that even taking them as true, they still did not 
constitute good cause for substitute counsel. 
In other words, the first ruling found that under the facts alleged Mr. 
Pokorney was not entitled to substitute counsel, and in the second ruling the 
court found that under the facts alleged Mr. Pokorney was not entitled to 
substitute counsel. These are the same rulings, there is no alternative grounds 
used to deny the motion. The only difference is that in the first ruling the court did 
not elaborate on its factual findings because it did not discuss them, and in the 
second, the court did not elaborate on its factual findings because it used the 
technique of assuming them to be true. But again, both rulings are that Mr. 
Pokorney's is not entitled to new counsel based on the facts as alleged. 
Back to Appellant's argument, if the facts as asserted by Mr. Pokorney 
are true, they indisputably require substitute counsel to be appointed. Since the 
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court assumed them to be true and still didn't provide substitute counsel, it clearly 
erred, and the state has not even attempted to argue otherwise, presumably 
because it cannot be so argued. Therefore, the court's ruling on the substitution 
of counsel issue must be reversed. 
But even assuming arguendo that the state is correct and the earlier 
rulings of the district court were somehow independent rulings unaffected by the 
court's later explanation concerning the facts it was using for its ruling, this still 
does not help the state. This is because the state has also not attempted to 
contest Appellant's claim that the district court used the incorrect legal standard 
in the earlier ruling, which also requires reversal. 
Next, the state incredibly argues there was no breakdown of 
communication and that Mr. Pokorney never claimed there was. First as to this, 
Mr. Pokorney twice discharged this particular attorney and there can be no more 
complete or irrevocable breakdown of communication than actually not having 
an attorney-client relationship anymore. 
Second, even if Mr. Pokorney had not discharged the attorney, the state is 
also wrong in its assertion that Mr. Pokorney had to claim that the attorney was 
not communicating with him in order to establish a total breakdown of 
communication. Rather, it is the breakdown of communication, and not direction 
of the breakdown, which results in a Sixth Amendment denial of counsel. 
As already set forth in Appellant's opening brief, the Tenth Circuit case of 
United States v. Lott, 310 F.3d 1231 (10th Cir. 2002) (also cited in Respondent's 
brief), explains as follows: 
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"Even if a defendant's counsel is competent, a serious breakdown 
in communication can result in an inadequate defense." United 
States v. Musa, 220 F.3d 1096, 1102 (9th Cir. 2000). A defendant 
who cannot communicate with his attorney cannot assist his 
attorney with preparation of his case, including suggesting potential 
witnesses to call and trial strategies to pursue, discussing whether 
the defendant himself should testify, and helping formulate other 
bread-and-butter decisions that can constitute the core of a 
successful defense. A trial court's failure to appoint new counsel 
when faced with a total breakdown in communication may thus 
constitute a denial of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment. 
Id., p. 1251 (emphasis added, footnote omitted). 
In short, there is no requirement that it be alleged the attorney is not 
communicating with the client, it is enough that the client cannot communicate 
with the attorney. And here, it cannot be seriously argued that Mr. Pokorney 
could communicate with the attorney since he undisputedly would have nothing 
to do with him. 1 
Finally as to this, the state is also incorrect in its complaint that since Mr. 
Pokorney did not claim a breakdown of communication, the district court did not 
error by not finding one. It was the court who characterized the issues that Mr. 
Pokorney was having with his attorney, not Mr. Pokorney. (Tr. 8/20/2010, p. 15.) 
The state points to no law that requires a defendant who is attempting to 
obtain substitute counsel (and who is for that reason necessarily making the 
argument himself and not with the assistance of counsel), to be able to precisely 
use the legal phrase that there is a total breakdown of communication. Rather, 
what the defendant needs to do (and which Mr. Pokorney tried to do), is to 
1 Appellant also notes that it cannot be seriously suggested that berating the 
attorney and writing to him in attempt to keep him off of his case is 
communicating with him as contemplated by the Sixth Amendment. 
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describe the problems he is having with his counsel, it is then up to the court to 
apply the applicable law. 
The state also complains that Appellant has cited no legal authority for the 
proposition that a defendant must be given a chance to "discuss" his allegations. 
Even ignoring that discussion or argument is the very thing which is supposed to 
happen at a motion hearing (and the district court had promised Mr. Pokorney a 
hearing on the substitute counsel issue), Appellant has already in his opening 
brief provided the law explaining what a district court must do. 
As the Court of Appeals explained in State v. Lippert, 276 P.3d 756 (Ct. 
App. 2012): 
The trial court must afford the defendant a full and fair opportunity 
to present the facts and reasons in support of a motion for 
substitution of counsel after having been made aware of the 
problems involved. 
The trial court must conduct a meaningful inquiry to determine 
whether a defendant possesses good cause for his or her request 
for substitute counsel. Specifically, the district court must make 
some reasonable, nonsuggestive efforts to determine the nature of 
the defendant's complaints and to apprise itself of the facts 
necessary to determine whether the defendant's relationship with 
his or her appointed attorney has deteriorated to the point that 
sound discretion requires substitution or even to such an extent that 
his or her Sixth Amendment right would be violated but for 
substitution. Even when the trial court suspects that the 
defendant's requests are disingenuous and designed solely to 
manipulate the judicial process and to delay the trial, perfunctory 
questioning is not sufficient. 
Id., p. 759 (internal citations omitted). 
It cannot be said that the district court in our case gave Mr. Pokorney the 
full and fair opportunity described above. The first time Mr. Pokorney tried to 
voice his complaints, the court stopped him and sent him off for a competency 
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evaluation. The second time the court cut off all discussion about what happened 
by claiming it was taking the allegations as true for the analysis. 
What the court needed to do was to listen to Mr. Pokorney's complaints, 
particularly since he had already discharged this same attorney and defended 
himself in a jury trial and so this was anything but a casual or fleeting complaint 
by a defendant. Or if the court didn't want to resolve the factual issues, it could 
have actually taken his allegations as true, which would have resulted in 
substitute counsel if the law was followed. But the court did neither, it did not 
listen to him and instead cut off Mr. Pokorney's arguments about his allegations 
by stating it was taking them as true, and then still didn't appoint substitute 
counsel. 
To summarize, the state has not even attempted to seriously dispute 
Appellant's challenges to the court's rulings which are clearly erroneous, and 
basically just ignores relevant rulings or claims they are not being challenged. 
So for all the reasons in Appellant's opening brief, Appellant continues to assert 
that the court's denial of substitute counsel must be reversed. 
111. 
THE COURT ERRED WHEN IT REFUSED TO ALLOW MR. POKORNEY TO 
RECALL AND IMPEACH WITNESSES 
Once more, that state does not attempt to argue that the court's ruling was 
correct, to wit, that a civil rule precluded Mr. Pokorney from recalling a witness for 
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the purpose of impeaching him. Instead, the state argues only that the order of 
presentation of witnesses is an administrative decision within the discretion of the 
trial court. 
Appellant does not dispute the general authority of a court to order the 
presentation of witnesses. But that is not happened here, the court didn't change 
the order of witnesses, it flat out refused to allow Mr. Pokorney to address an 
entire area of questioning in a criminal case expressly and repeatedly based on a 
rule of civil procedure. This was clear error, which as explained below, was not 
harmless. 
But also, Appellant in his brief alternatively argued at length that assuming 
some other limitation on the calling or confronting witnesses applies, the district 
court still abused its discretion under the circumstances. The state never 
responds to that argument and Appellant still asserts that the court's ruling must 
be reversed as explained in Appellant's opening brief. 
The state does address the Sixth Amendment issues, to wit, that Mr. 
Pokorney's right to confront and right to present a complete defense were 
violated when the court precluded him from presenting relevant evidence. The 
state does not dispute that the proffered evidence was relevant. Rather, it argues 
only that the court did not abuse its discretion by denying the request to recall the 
witness because any problem was Mr. Pokorney's fault. 
The state correctly explains that Mr. Pokorney did not understand, when 
promised by the court that he could call R.P. the next day, that this did not mean 
he could examine him about his prior testimony. Of course, the court did not 
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actually say at that time he could not examine him like that, so the state argues 
that Mr. Pokorney cannot rely on his ignorance of the proper procedure for 
examination and cross-examination and that a prose litigant is held to the same 
rules as attorneys. 
But the rule preventing such examination is a civil rule which does not 
apply to examination and cross examination in a criminal case and so Mr. 
Pokorney cannot be faulted for his ignorance of a rule which does not apply. 
Even if he may not justifiably be ignorant of the court's general authority to 
control the order of examination, this is a far cry from faulting him for not 
knowing, as the state suggests, that the court's general authority will allow it to 
apply the bright line rule from civil cases which states that a witness once 
examined may not be examined about the same matter. 
In other words, even assuming for the sake of argument that trial judges 
can and do commonly control the examination of the witnesses in criminal cases 
in the same manner as the civil rule provides, that changes nothing here. While a 
prose litigant may well be held to the same rules as an attorney, this is not a rule 
of criminal procedure that could be ascertained by a pro se defendant (or even 
an attorney inexperienced in trial practice for that matter). The rule is not in the 
Idaho Criminal Rules and so a complete reading of them would not alert the 
defendant. If for some reason the defendant were to read the Idaho Rules of 
Civil Procedure and stumble upon the rule, negative inference would actually 
lead him to believe that it does not apply in a criminal case since it is not also a 
criminal rule. 
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The case cited by the state it its brief, State v. Johnson, 132 Idaho 726, 
979 P.2d 128 (Ct.App. 1999), only makes the general statement that the court 
can order presentation of witnesses and that case concerned taking witnesses 
out of order to accommodate them, not the exclusion of the testimony. So even if 
the defendant was aware of the caselaw (or the relevant rule of evidence) 
establishing the court's general authority, this in no way would alert the 
defendant that his cross examination cannot be completed later after he gets the 
impeachment materials (that he did not know he needed because the trial 
schedule was discussed ex parte) from his jail cell. 
Thus, the state cannot rely here on Mr. Pokorney's ignorance of a civil 
rule which does not apply to argue he was not deprived of his Sixth Amendment 
rights. Rather, the court deprived him of those rights by depriving him of the 
opportunity for full cross examination by leading him to believe he could later 
finish it and then invoking an inapplicable rule to prevent it. But even if the court 
is considered to have merely invoked an informal procedure allowed under its 
general authority, it still abused its discretion under these circumstances, which 
include the reasons Mr. Pokorney had not finished his cross examination as well 
as the court's failure to make any actual findings supporting its apparent ruling 
that the interest of the witness in not being recalled outweighed Mr. Pokorney 
right to present indisputably relevant evidence. 
Finally, the error was not harmless. The state first argues that since the 
court's ruling was limited to recalling R.P. who testified only as allegations 
concerning himself, that any error is harmless regarding the conviction on the 
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other count concerning W.P. This is not correct. This was a case of credibility, so 
if the jury learned that one witness changed his story from trial to trial, it cannot 
be said beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury still would have convicted the 
defendant on a count concerning another witness. 
Next, despite the battle with the court over the impeachment issue, Mr. 
Pokorney was able to give one specific example of how he wanted to impeach 
R.P. with his prior testimony. Mr. Pokorney said that he was "going to ask him 
about his statement that he has his clothes off, because in the earlier---" and 
then the court cut him off. 
The state argues that any error is harmless because R.P. did not testify 
that his clothes were off. Rather, he testified that he went to his parents' bed with 
clothes on but that his pants were "pulled down" when Mr. Pokorney rubbed his 
genitals on him. The state argues that since R.P. just testified that his pants 
were pulled down, and not that his clothes were off, the offer of proof 
mischaracterizes R.P.'s testimony and there is nothing in the record to suggest 
that he could be effectively impeached (and so an acquittal would not have 
resulted). 
Besides unfairly picking nits about the words used by Mr. Pokorney, who 
was not even able to finish his sentence before being cut off by the court, the 
state ignores the portion of the record which shows us exactly how R.P. would be 
very effectively impeached. In the original trial transcript (which is part of our 
record), R.P. testified: 
A He was rubbing up against me. 
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Q. Okay. And what part of your body was being rubbed? 
A My private. 
Q. Was your private with clothes on or your private with no clothes on? 
A On. 
Q. On? And what part-and who was rubbing against you? 
A My dad. 
Q. What part of dad's body was rubbing up against your private? 
A His private. 
Docket 34945, Tr. p. 201, In. 25-p. 202, In. 12 (emphasis added). 
So in the instant trial R.P. testified that his pants were pulled down when 
Mr. Pokorney was allegedly rubbing on him but in the original trial he testified to 
the direct opposite. 
The importance of this impeachment cannot be overstated because it 
must be remembered there were two counts concerning R.P. and the jury could 
only reach a verdict as to one. Since the jury obviously already had some 
problems with R.P.'s testimony, had it known that he had earlier testified 
differently on this point, it cannot be said beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
jury would have convicted him on this, or any, count. Thus, the state has failed in 
its burden of proving the error harmless. 
CONCLUSION 
For all the reasons in this and Appellant's brief, Mr. Pokorney requests this 
Court reverse and vacate his convictions because there was insufficient evidence 
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to support them. Alternatively, Mr. Pokorney requests this Court vacate his 
convictions because of the failure to appoint substitute counsel and remand this 
case for a new trial with substitute counsel. Finally, he requests the convictions 
be vacated because he could not recall and impeach witnesses. 
DATED this ~ day of October, 2012. " 
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